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NOTES 
THE BARBER DECISION: A QUESTIONABLE 
APPROACH TO TERMINATION OF LIFE-
SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR THE PATIENT IN 
A PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in medical technology and science have 
placed us on the threshold of a new terrain - the penumbra 
where death begins but life, in some form, continues. l Science 
and technology enable physicians to artifically maintain respira-
tion when the patient's capacity to breathe spontaneously has 
been lost. 2 Artificially maintained patients such as those pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state may never recover con-
sciousness. A persistent vegetative state occurs when rudimen-
tary brain stem functions remain but the major components of 
cerebral function, e.g., cognitive processes, are irreversibly lost 
and when chances for recovery are indeterminable.3 Therefore, 
1. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1980). 
This case was decided by the Court of Chancery, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) after the 
Delaware Supreme Court determined that the lower court had the power to authorize 
the removal of life-support systems. 421 A.2d 1342-43. 
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL LEGAL, AND ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION: DEFINING DEATH]. For further discussion of the types of machines available, see 
M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW (1981). 
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2, at 18. Such persons may 
exhibit spontaneous, involuntary movements such as yawns or facial grimaces, their eyes 
may be open and they may be capable of breathing without assistance. The condition is 
often described as awake but unaware since any apparent wakefulness does not represent 
awareness of self or environment. Id. Persons in a persistent vegetative state are consid-
ered to be permanently unconscious. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: 
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS, 173 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT]. However, there is still uncertainty about any judgment that a par-
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as a result, we are now compelled to distinguish between death, 
as we have known it, and death in which the body lives in some 
fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) does not.' At-
tempts by attorneys, physicians, and clergy to draw this distinc-
tion have been made~ with varying degrees of success. 
Even where it is possible to make this distinction, serious 
medical, ethical, and legal issues remain with regard to the type 
and level of treatment provided to these patients.s For example, 
there is no single applicable law which exists to authorize a phy-
sician to terminate life-support systems for a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state.7 It is precisely this issue - that there are no 
ticular patient's state is permanent: 
The first uncertainty affects any scientific proposition 
about as-yet-unobserved cases. No matter how extensive the 
past evidence is for an empirical generalization, it may yet be 
falsified by future experience. Certainty in prognosis is always 
a matter of degree, typically based upon the quantity and 
quality of the evidence from which a prediction is made. 
Second, this empirical qualification is especially serious in 
predictions about unconsciousness because the evidence rele-
vant to a prognosis of permanence is still quite limited. The 
overall number of such patients is small, and most cases have 
not been carefully studied or adequately reported. Further-
more, the number of variables affecting prognosis (for exam-
ple, the cause of unconsciousness, the patient's age and other 
diseases, the length of time the patient has been unconscious, 
and the kinds of therapy applied) is large and imperfectly 
understood. 
Finally, any prediction that a patient will not regain con-
sciousness before dying, regardless of the treatment under-
taken, contains an implicit assumption about future medical 
breakthroughs. Since some such patients can be maintained 
alive for extended periods of time (often years rather than 
days, weeks, or months), this assumption about treatment in-
novations can be a long-range one. At the moment, however, it 
introduces only a very small uncertainty, since the possibility 
of repairing the neurologic injuries that destroy consciousness 
is exceedingly remote. 
[d. at 176-77. 
4. 421 A.2d at 1342. 
5. See generally supra note 3. 
6. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2; LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS, (A.E. DOUDERA 
& J.D. PETERS, eds. 1982); M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2; THE HASTINGS 
CENTER, THE HASTINGS CENTER'S BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ETHICS, BIOMEDICS, AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1984); D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF DEATH AND DYING (1981) 
for a discussion of medical, legal and ethical issues. 
7. See generally supra notes 3 and 6. 
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legal standards for the termination of life-support systems for 
the patient in a persistent vegetative state - which poses serious 
problems for the treating physicians. This lack of standards 
leaves the physician at risk for civil and criminal liability, as 
well as professional, ethical, and moral sanctions. Moreover, pa-
tients and their relatives are without the ability to control the 
patient's course of treatment. A California Court of Appeal for 
the Second District has recently taken a major step in address-
ing these issues in Barber v. Superior Court.s The Barber court 
found that the withdrawal of all life-support systems (respirator, 
nutrition and hydration) from a patient in a persistent vegeta-
tive state within only five days, was not an unlawful failure to 
perform a legal duty where the patient had virtually no chance 
of recovery.9 
This Note will review the major cases dealing with termina-
tion of life-support systems for patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state. Although the discussion will focus primarily on these 
patients, many of the issues discussed are applicable to other 
patients in similar situations, i.e., those who have terminal can-
cer. The Note will specifically relate case law from the other 
states to the facts and holdings of Barber, the most recent Cali-
fornia case in this area. Finally, in light of the various legal ap-
proaches taken by California and other states regarding termina-
tion of life-support systems for these patients, this Note will 
propose some alternatives to the Barber decision. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Fundamental to any consideration of withdrawal of life-sup-
port systems is the definition of death. Historically, the standard 
for defining death was the permanent cessation of respiration 
and circulation. Io Because of advances in medical technology, 
the law has shifted its emphasis toward a definition of brain 
death, recognizing cerebral function as that function which most 
clearly delineates human life. ll The medically accepted defini-
8. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
9. [d. at 1020-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93. 
10. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2, at 3. 
11. See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2, at 24-42 for a discussion of this 
shift in emphasis and the concepts and policy consequences involved in a determination 
of death. 
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tion of brain death is an "'irreversible loss of all brain func-
tion.' "12 Although there is no uniform law, 26 states have 
adopted legislation based on the Uniform Determination of 
Death Act, recognizing the absence of brain function as an ac-
ceptable criterion for the definition of death. 13 Further treat-
ment of a patient who is brain dead is unnecessary in those 
jurisdictions.14 
The definition of brain death excludes those patients who 
continue to exhibit lower brain function, but remain in a persis-
tent vegetative state, will not regain consciousness, cannot 
speak, think, or feel but who breathe and maintain basic meta-
bolic functions of body temperature, circulation and elimina-
tion. III Thus, termination of treatment for a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state would be homocide under California 
statutes.16 The Barber case is illustrative of this type of situa-
12. Black, Brain Death, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338, 338·39 (1978). A total irreversi· 
ble absence of all brain function is necessary. Some 30 different criteria have been pro-
posed for the diagnosis of brain death, the most accurate and widely accepted being the 
"Harvard Criteria." Under the "Harvard Criteria," brain death is diagnosed upon the 
concurrence of four general conditions: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally 
applied intense stimuli; (2) no movenlent or breathing; (3) no relexes, and (4) flat or 
isoelectric electroencephalogram. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 34-35. 
13. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 27. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connect-
icut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Washington and Wyoming have adopted legislation recognizing 
the absence of brain function as acceptable criteria for the definition of death. Id. at 27 
n.16. California's brain death statute states: "[aln individual who has sustained ... irre-
versible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1984). The statute also requires that a 
second physician independently confirm the death and neither physician be involved in 
decisions regarding the transplantation of organs. Id. § 7181-7182. 
14. 147 Cal. App. 3d. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
15. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 27. When deprived of oxygen, the human brain dies 
in stages rather than all at once. The cortex is the most sensitive portion of the brain 
and, therefore, the first to die with the deprivation of normal oxygenated blood flow. 
This is the site of the highest centers of human intelligence. Some authorities believe 
that the lack of oxygen flow to the brain for a period of 4 to 6 minutes will result in a 
total and irreversible loss of cortical brain functions. However, the loss of oxygenated 
blood for a similar period of time may have no effect on the lower brain or brain stem, 
which is the part of the brain tissue that controls respiration, heart rate, and blood pres-
sure. Id. at 24-25. 
16. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice afore-
thought." CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1984). The Barber court found that in the 
situation where the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and the patient's family 
consents, the doctor has no legal duty to maintain life-sustaining techniques including 
intravenous therapy. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484. Lacking this duty, there 
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tion. In Barber, the patient's brain stem was functioning so that 
the standard of brain death did not apply.I7 Complicating the 
lack of legal standards, is the difficulty in establishing with med-
ical certainty when a persistent vegetative state exists. IS The de-
cision to withhold or to withdraw life-support systems in these 
cases requires analysis of several issues. These issues include: 
the right of the incompetent patient in a persistent vegetative 
state to refuse treatment, the level of treatment that should be 
provided to the patient, the determination as to when treatment 
should be withheld, and who should make the decisions. More-
over, a clarification in terminology is important because it would 
allow physicians and the courts to characterize their conduct to-
wards a patient with precision. I9 
A. The Right To Refuse Treatment 
Central to any discussion of what treatments can be with-
held from those in a persistent vegetative state is the concept 
that the individual has a right to refuse treatment. The right of 
self-determination is a right basic in American law and generally 
includes the right of a competent adult to reject life saving med-
ical care.20 This has been stated succinctly by Judge Cardozo, in 
the frequently-cited formulation: "[e]very human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an opera-
tion without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which 
can be no criminal liability when all life-support is discontinued. The court concluded 
that discontinuing futile treatment is not unlawful homocide. However, this holding 
should not be considered definitive since it is binding only on California's lower courts 
and for federal courts applying California law. The law in this extremely sensitive area 
must be regarded as unsettled until the California Supreme Court or the legislature set 
the final rules. Rubsamen, A Landmark Case on the Physician's Duty to Maintain Life, 
PROF. LIABiLiTY NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1983. See also CALiFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, CON-
SENT MANUAL, 55, 61-64 (1984 ed.) for further discussion on the implications of the Bar-
ber case and the potential for criminal liability because of the lack of clear legislative 
guidance in this area. 
A physician is exempt from this liability when there has been either (1) a designa-
tion of an attorney-in-fact for medical decisions under CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West. 
Supp. 1984), see infra notes 100-05, or (2) a binding directive signed according to the 
Natural Death Act under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West. Supp. 1984), 
see infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
17. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
18. See supra note 3. 
19. M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2, at 573-74. 
20. J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL, 32 (1983). 
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he is liable in damages."21 The right to reject life saving medical 
care has been found by some state courts to be part of the fun-
damental constitutional right of privacy.22 It is necessary, how-
ever, to reconcile the individual's right to refuse treatment (right 
of privacy) with the state's interest in preserving life.23 There is 
a substantial distinction between the state's insistence that 
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to 
a case where there is an incurable illness.24 It follows, then, that 
if competent persons may refuse treatment in certain situations, 
such as when the treatment merely prolongs the moment of dy-
ing but does not provide a substantial benefit, the same right, 
extended through a substitute judgment test, should be afforded 
to those who are incompetent since the value of human dignity 
extends equally to both. 21i This right has been recognized by sev-
21. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129·30, 105 N.E. 92 
(1914), overruled on other grounds, in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). ' 
22. J, ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 33. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 
647, cert, denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976): Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980): Severns v. Wilmington Medical 
Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 
266 (1981); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). The right to refuse life 
saving treatment has been discussed extensively. See Sherlock, For Everything There is 
a Season: The Right to Die in the United States, 1982 BY,U, L. REV, 545·616; Note, A 
Patient's Last Rights· Termination of Medical Care· An Analysis of New York's In re 
Storar, 46 ALB, L. REV. 1380·413 (1982); Brown, Therefore Choose Death, 10 HUM, RTs, 
39·45 (1982). At times courts have found the existence of dependant third parties, such 
as children, to be the basis for overriding a patient's refusal to accept life saving care. 
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. 
Cir.) reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. 
George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). 
23. 373 Mass. at 744·45, 370 N.E.2d at 427. The state has a claimed interest in (1) 
the preservation of life, (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties, (3) 
the prevention of suicide, and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profes· 
sion. Id, at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
24. Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 425·26. However, in a recent California case, Bartling v. 
Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984), the Court of Appeal for 
the Second District, took a major step forward in expanding the right to refuse treat· 
ment for a competent adult patient who, although seriously ill, was not terminal. The 
court found that this type of patient's constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy in· 
cludes the right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 195·97 & n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225·26 
& n.8. While the Bartling case represents a significant step towards an individual's right 
of self determination, it is limited to competent adult patients and not applicable to 
patients in a persistent vegetative state. For a discussion on the Bartling case, see Annas, 
Prisoner in the ICU: The Tragedy of William Bartling, 14 HASTINGS CTR, REP, 6, 28·29 
(1984). 
25. Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428. "To presume that the incompetent person must 
always be subjected to what many rational and intelligent persons may decline is to 
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eral state supreme courts for those patients who are in a persis-
tent vegetative state or who are terminally ill. 28 
B. Standards for Terminating Treatment for Patients in 
a Persistent Vegetative State 
1. Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatments 
The traditional test employed in decisionmaking regarding 
the requirement that a given treatment be provided to a patient 
is whether the treatment is ordinary or extraordinary.27 Histori-
cally, this distinction emerged in the Roman Catholic tradition 
to differentiate optional treatment from treatment that was obli-
gatory for medical professionals to offer and patients to accept.28 
Under these terms, treatments have been distinguished accord-
ing to their simplicity, invasiveness, naturalness, and expense.2D 
Thus, a painful, intrusive treatment (such as use of a respirator) 
that would merely prolong a very impaired life would probably 
not be required, but treatment (such as the administration of 
intravenous fluids) that would keep the patient alive without un-
due suffering or risk of harm, although it would not relieve in-
competency, could not be withheld.30 This concept of extraordi-
nary treatment was used in In re Quinlan,31 the seminal case 
downgrade the status of the incompetent by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human 
worth and vitality." Id. See generally infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the substitute judgment test. 
26. Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432; Severns, 421 A.2d at 1340; In re Spring, 380 
Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120, 660 P.2d at 
742. 
27. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PA-
TIENTS, supra note 6, at 73. 
28. Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water? 13 HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP. 5, 19 (1983) (citing JAMES J. MCCARTNEY, The Development of the Doc-
trine of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means of Preserving Life in Catholic Moral Theol-
ogy Before the Karen Quinlan Case, LINACRE QUARTERLY 47 (1980), 215ff). 
29. Lynn & Childress, supra note 28, at 19. The terms "ordinary" and "extraordi-
nary" are extremely vague and used inconsistently in literature. See generally M. SHA-
PIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2 at 726-28. 
30. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 50-51. 
31. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. The patient, Karen Quinlan, suffered from irreversible 
brain damage resulting from two 15 minute periods when she stopped breathing. The 
actual cause of the respiratory arrest was unknown. She was determined to be in a pet-
sistent vegetative state. Medical experts believed she could not survive without a respira-
tor. She had previously expressed her distaste for continuation of life by extraordinary 
medical procedures. Her father brought suit to be appointed as guardian and to request 
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regarding the treatment of those who exist in a persistent vege-
tative state. The Quinlan court found the use of a respirator on 
a 22 year old woman in a persistent vegetative state for over 
eleven months was extraordinary treatment.32 
The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" incorporate a 
conclusion as to whether the benefits of the treatment justify its 
burdens but fail to indicate which medical treatments are re-
quired in any given case.83 Courts need further refinement of 
these broad terms. In considering the effect of discontinuing life-
support systems, prudence dictates that the balance of benefits 
and burdens be directly addressed.34 In partial recognition of 
this problem, some courts require major weight be given to the 
needs and interests of the incompetent patient, rather than the 
needs and interests of families, doctors and society, with whom 
the patient's interests may conflict.311 
2. Substituted Judgment and Best Interests Tests 
The majority of courts that have addressed the question of 
terminating treatment for the incompetent person have adopted 
the substituted judgment test.86 This test attempts to treat the 
incompetent patient as an individual (capable of making in-
formed choices) by asking what he would choose if cognizant of 
his interests and able to communicate.87 Where the patient, 
while competent, has previously made his wishes regarding 
treatment known, the court has a basis for inferring the wishes 
removal of the respirator. Id. 
32. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668. The use of a respirator can be considered ordinary in 
the context of a possibly curable patient, but extraordinary in the context of the forced 
sustaining of cardiorespiratory functions of an irreversibly doomed patient. Id. 
33. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 50. 
34.Id. 
35. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 
N.E.2d 417, where the courts took this approach. 
36. Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1967); 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647; In re 
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 
(1981). In essence, the doctrine of substituted judgment, in its original inception, called 
on the court to " 'don the mental mantle of the incompetent.' " Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 
752,370 N.E.2d at 431 (citing In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962». 
37. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51. This test is helpful when the patient is in a 
persistent vegetative state and has not designated an attorney-in-fact with power over 
health care decisions. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 644. 
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of the patient.38 If, however, the patient has not made his wishes 
clear, those close to the patient can provide the court with their 
feelings about what the patient would have wanted if compe-
tent.39 The goal of the substituted judgment test is to maximize 
the individual's right of self-determination and privacy.4o 
Another approach is the best interests test, which is perhaps 
less confusing to decisionmakers in those cases where there has 
been no prior expression of preference by the patient.41 Instead 
of determining what the patient's choice would be under the cir-
cumstances, this test involves a determination of whether the 
treatment, in light of the extended life made possible and the 
burden of this extended life, serves the patient's best interests}2 
In fact, the substituted judgment test (a subjective approach) 
and best interests test (an objective approach) should often 
reach identical results for an i~competent patient, who, if com-
petent and able to make intelligent choices, would presumably 
choose that which would best serve his interests.43 The substi-
tuted judgment and best interests tests recognize the right of a 
competent adult to reject lifesaving medical care and extend this 
right to the incompetent patient}4 
C. Application of the Standards 
1. Withdrawal of Respirators and Intravenous Feeding 
Devices 
In some states medical treatment involving the use of respi-
rators, surgery, and chemotherapy may be legally terminated or 
withheld from incompetent patients by the application of the 
substituted judgment test to determine what the patient would 
38. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51. For example, in the Eichner case, Brother 
Fox had previously indicated that if he were in a persistent vegetative state, he would 
want a respirator removed. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd sub nom., In re 
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. 
39. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 347. 
40. Id. at 277. 
41. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51. 
42.Id. 
43. J. ROBERTSON, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judg-
ment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 73 (1976). 
44. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51-52. 
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have chosen if competent.411 However, there is less legal'6 and 
medical" agreement as to whether other less invasive forms of 
medical care, (such as nutrition, hydration, and antibiotics) can 
be withheld. If the basis for stopping treatment is its intrusive 
or burdensome nature, and not a decision concerning quality of 
life, then medical treatments that do not impose this burden but 
which do extend life, could not legitimately be withheld from 
patients such as those in a persistent vegetative state.4S How-
ever, if continued life, regardless of how easily sustained, is not 
in the best interests of the patient, there seems to be little justi-
fication in continuing to provide nutrition and hydration for 
those patients identified as being in a persistent vegetative 
state.49 Also, if there is no legal requirement to use a respirator 
to supplant a patient's breathing functions because of a hopeless 
and terminal prognosis, there appears to be little obligation to 
require continued artificial intravenous feeding. IIO 
45. Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 52 
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 
68 Ohio Misc. I, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 49, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 
114, 660 P.2d 738. There have been a limited number of cases that have treated this 
issue and have reached this consensus. In the absence of case law and statute, this right 
is not recognized in other jurisdictions. 
46. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra note 55. A related issue with unique considerations involves decisions 
to discontinue life-sustaining treatment for seriously ill newborns and infants. It is ac-
cepted community practice that infants should receive all therapies that are clearly ben-
eficial to them. Decisions should not be withheld on the basis of the infant's anticipated 
or actual limited potential or the present and future lack of available community re-
sources. Life-sustaining treatment should not be withheld simply because the infant is 
retarded. In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial, the 
generally accepted standards require a presumption in favor of treatment. CALIFORNIA 
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66e-66p. 
48. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 59. Since nutrition and antibiotics do not ordi-
narily involve such burdens as to make the additional life they provide undesirable, they 
would be legally required under this approach. Id. 
49. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, 
supra note 3, at 181, 190 & n.49. 
50. See D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 54 (Cum. Supp. 1983). One problem that arises 
is how to determine what is a hopeless and terminal prognosis. For example, in the Quin-
lan case, the physicians believed that withdrawal of the respirator would result in the 
patient's death, 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655. She was removed from the respirator in 
1976 and continued to live in an extended care facility, until she died of pneumonia at 
the age of 31 years. S.F. Chronicle, June 12, 1985, at 1. Likewise, in the Barber case, the 
patient's wife testified at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Herbert's physicians said he 
would live for approximately a minimum of 30 minutes to a maxiumum of couple of 
hours after the respirator was removed. L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1983, Part II at 1. 
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Only three cases besides Barber, In re Severns,'n In re Con-
roy,62 and In re Hier/'s have involved placing or removing intra-
venous and nasogastric feeding tubes from, or the provision of 
nutrition to, comatose, semicomatose, or seriously ill adult pa-
tients. In Severns, the patient had been comatose for over five 
months when, after an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded 
that all medical life-supports, including feeding, could be discon-
tinued if it became necessary to surgically implant a feeding 
tube in her trachea [sic].Ci4 In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court extended the Quinlan holding to allow removal, in certain 
circumstances, of all life-sustaining treatment, including feeding, 
for elderly incompetent patients who are neither comatose nor 
vegetative, but whose mental and physical functioning is se-
verely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy, 
even with life-sustaining treatment, is one year or less.66 
51. 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
52. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
53. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959, reh'g denied, _ Mass. _, 465 N.E.2d 
261 (1984). In Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 
49, 426 N.E.2d 809, a common pleas court (probate division) allowed removal of a respi-
rator from a terminally ill 70 year old woman, but specifically stated that the court's 
order removal was only for removal of the respirator and not the other life-supports, 
which included a nasogastric tube and a catheter. [d. at 3, 13, 22 Ohio Op. 3d at 49-51, 
56, 426 N.E.2d at 810, 816. 
54. 425 A.2d at 160. The court apparently misinterpreted the medical data. A feed-
ing tube would not be inserted in the trachea, since the trachea connects with the lungs. 
This decision was made following an earlier decision on this case by the Delaware Su-
preme Court, which concluded that the Court of Chancery (lower court) had the power 
to approve to continue or not restore any of Mrs. Severns' life-sustaining systems. 421 
A.2d at 1344. The Severns case involved a 55 year old woman who was in a comatose 
state as the result of an auto accident and who had previously made it clear she did not 
want hopeless treatment to continue. Her husband sought appointment as guardian and 
authorization to remove life-sustaining supports. 425 A.2d at 157-58. 
55. 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1228, 1231, 1236-37. The court found that this treat-
ment may be withdrawn or withheld when: (1) it is clear that the particular patient 
would have refused the treatment under such circumstances involved; or (2) there is 
trustworthy evidence that patient would have refused treatment and decisionmaker is 
satisfied, that burdens of patient's continued life with treatment outweigh benefits of that 
life for patient; or (3) absent any evidence that patient would have refused treatment, 
net burdens of patient's life with treatment clearly and markedly outweigh benefits that 
patient derives from life. [d. at _, 470 A.2d at 1229, 1232. 
However, there remains substantial disagreement among ethicists whether the provi-
sion of food and water should ever be considered extraordinary treatment. For example, 
to some ethicists both the natural and ordinary quality of feeding requires that it should 
never be withdrawn. See HEALY, MEDICAL ETHICS, 61-77 (1960); McFADDEN, MEDICAL 
ETHICS, 227-47 (1961); O'DONNELL, MORALS IN MEDICINE, 57, 66-68 (1959). A code of 
treatment for severely ill children, drafted by t.he Nassau (N.Y.) Pediatric Society Com-
mittee on Ethics and Survival, provides that "ordinary measures are food, fluids, oxygen, 
11
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The Hier case involved an appeal by a guardian ad litem 
regarding the correctness of a lower court order relative to sur-
gery for a seriously ill 92 year old woman with a long history of 
mental, illness who repeatedly refused to allow placement of a 
gastric feeding tube:'6 The Hier court found that it was unneces-
sary to put an unwilling patient through a major surgical proce~ 
dure in order to provide adequate nutritional support which 
could not be provided by intravenous feeding. II? The distinction 
drawn by the Hier court, in contrast to the Conroy and Barber 
cases, was between supplying nutritional support with only mod-
est intrusiveness and supplying it through the use of highly in-
trusive surgical procedures. lls 
2. Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
In addition to the patient's right to have treatment with-
drawn, common practice has also recognized a right to have 
treatment withheld, such as the right not to be resuscitated. A 
decision not to be resuscitated is accomplished through the use 
of a "No Code" or "Do Not Resuscitate" order which specifies 
there is to be no resuscitation in the event of a cardiac or pulmo-
nary arrest. liB A "No Code" order was used in the case of In re 
antibiotics and pain killers." Waldman, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly III Child, 88 
J. PED, 890, 892 (1976). This position was advocated by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop 
who stated that: "withholding fluids or nourishment at any time is an immoral act." 
TIME. April 11, 1983, at 69. 
On the other hand, several scholars are of the opinion that if the patient is beyond 
all hope of recovery, the burden of continued feeding is disproportionate to the benefit it 
will effect. See WILSON. DEATH BY DECISION 70-71 (1975); Ramsey Prolonged Dying: Not 
Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14 (1976). The American Medical Association 
Judicial Council, in Opinion 2.11 (Jan. 10, 1981), reprinted in 45 CONN. MED. 721 (1981), 
concluded that when a patient ie i~reversibly comatose or in a permanent vegetative 
state, "all means of life support may be discontinued." 
56. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 200-01, 464 N.E.2d at 960-61. The tube was required be-
cause she suffered from a hiatal hernia and a cervical diverticulum in her esophagus that 
impeded her ability to ingest food orally. The tube could be reinserted through the abdo-
men without surgery if reinsertion was accomplished in a relatively short time. In Mrs. 
Hier's case, reinsertion would require surgery. Mrs. Hier's guardian ad litem appealed 
from a lower court judgment ordering the appointment of a temporary guardian to con-
sent to the administration of drugs but without authority to consent to the surgery. Id. 
57. Id, at 208-10, 465 N.E.2d at 964-65. 
58.Id. 
59. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 188-89. The use of "No Code" orders has become 
generally accepted practice. Nevertheless, it must be understood that no California stat-
utory provisions or precedential judicial decisions expressly approve the use of "No 
Code" orders. It is possible that any physician who issues such orders and any hospital 
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Dinnerstein,60 where the court held that the law does not pro-
hibit a course of medical treatment which excludes attempts at 
resuscitation in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest.61 
The Dinnerstein case involved a 67 year old woman with 
Alzheimer's disease who was confined to a hospital in an essen-
tially vegetative state after a stroke.62 A "No Code" order is not 
used when treatment of the patient's underlying illness offers a 
hope of restoration to a normal existence, but rather when the 
patient is in the terminal stages of an unremitting, incurable fa-
tal illness.63 
D. The Decision Makers 
One of the difficult issues involved in the treatment of pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state is who should participate 
in a decision that treatment should be discontinued. The ap-
proaches taken by the various state courts involve the family 
and physician either making the decision alone or in combina-
tion with judicial approval, the use of ethics committees or prog-
nosis boards, or the appointment of a guardian ad litem.64 The 
following cases illustrate the different approaches. 
1. The Quinlan Approach 
The Quinlan court found that the decision to terminate life-
support systems should be made by the patient's family and 
that has a policy that allows the use of "No Code" orders may be found civilly and/or 
criminally liable. However, the "No Code" orders policy which has been adopted by the 
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for use in Los Angeles County facilities is 
indicative of generally accepted practice. It also appears to be generally accepted that 
"No Code" orders authorized by the patient or the patient's surrogate decision-maker in 
such situations are usually proper. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 
64. 
60. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). 
61. Id. at 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 139. 
62. Id. at 466-67, 380 N.E.2d at 134-35. 
63. Id. at 474, 380 N.E.2d at 138. Due to the highly intrusive nature of resuscitation 
procedures and the fact that under some circumstances these procedures merely allow 
the patient to continue the inevitable process of dying, doctors sometimes decide against 
these measures in cases when an incompetent or terminally ill patient suffers cardiac 
arrest. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 71. FOI: a case study on the magnitude of this 
practice in a county hospital, see Levy & Lambe-Shear, Do Not Resuscitate Orders in a 
County Hospital, 140 WEST. J. MED. 111 (1984). 
64. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text. 
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physicians, as long as a hospital-appointed ethics committee 
concurred with this decision.611 Judicial intervention was termed 
inappropriate, not only because it would be a gratuitous en-
croachment upon the medical profession's field of competence, 
but because it would be impossibly cumbersome.66 The concept 
of an ethics committee, composed of medical and non-medical 
personnel, is to serve as an advisory body "to provide a regular 
forum for more input and dialogue in individual situations and 
'to allow the responsibility of these judgments to be shared. "67 
The Quinlan rationale of leaving the choice to the physician and 
family, unless disagreement occurs, requires a determination by 
the physicians that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
patient will return from the comatose state to a cognitive, sapi-
ent state,66 a determination by the family of the patient's proba-
ble choice, and concurrence of an ethics committee.69 
2. The Saikewicz Approach 
In contrast to Quinlan, after the decision in Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,7° the Massachu-
setts courts require the appointment of a guardian and the use 
of the judicial system to resolve decisions concerning life-pro-
longing treatment for incompetent patients. The Saikewicz case 
concerned a severely retarded 67 year old man suffering from 
acute myelomonocytic leukemia, an invariably fatal disease of 
the blood.71 While chemotherapy is the established treatment 
65. 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. 
66. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. 
67. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 688 (citing Teel, The Physicians' Dilemma: A Doctor's 
View: What The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8 (1975». This concept was criti-
cized in the case of In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 134, 660 P.2d at 749-50. 
68. The use of the word "sapient" appears in other cases such as Saikewicz, 373 
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, and is again illustrative of 
the problems in terminology in this area. The definition of the word "sapient" is "pos-
sessing or expressing great sagacity or discernment," WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY. 1042 (1983). If treatment were required only when it would return a patient 
to a sage or discerning state, one could anticipate that medical treatment would not be 
required, for example, for those afflicted with Down's Syndrome. This seems unlikely to 
be the court's intent. Probably the family of a person in a persistent vegetative state 
would be willing to accept a lesser standard of consciousness than "sapient," when as-
sessing the benefits of continued treatment. 
69. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. 
70. 373 Mass. at 756-58, 370 N.E.2d at 432-34. 
71. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. 
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for this disease, the patient's guardian ad litem and attending 
physicians advised against the treatment because they felt it was 
not in the patient's best interests since the adverse side effects 
and discomfort as well as the inability of the patient to under-
stand the treatment outweighed the limited prospect of any ben-
efit.72 The Saikewicz court found that the resolution of the issue 
of determining who should decide whether life-prolonging treat-
ment should be withheld from a person incapable of making his 
own decision requires: 
the process of detached but passionate investiga-
tion and decision that forms the ideal on which 
the judicial branch of government was created. 
Achieving this ideal is [the] responsibility [of the 
judiciary] ... , and is not to be entrusted to any 
other group purporting to represent the 'morality 
and conscience of our society,' no matter how 
highly motivated or impressively constituted.73 
Saikewicz is considered the leading case for those jurisdic-
72. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419. The physicians stated that chemotherapy would 
offer only a 30-40 % chance of remission lasting 2-13 months and no cure. Chemotherapy 
would also result in serious adverse side effects, including pain and severe nausea, and 
the treatment requires the patient's cooperation over several weeks. Because of his 
mental retardation, the patient would be unable to cooperate. The physicians testified 
that the patient was in no pain and probably would die painlessly within a matter of 
weeks or months if the leukemia ran its natural course without chemotherapy. Id. at 733-
34, 370 N.E.2d at 421. The Saikewicz court affirmed the lower court's decision that the 
medical personnel should not administer chemotherapy. Id. at 735, 370 N.E.2d at 422. 
Today some hematologists might question the conclusion that treatment of acutemy-
elomonocytic leukemia offers no hope of cure. See Wilkinson, Legal Resolution of Denial 
of Access to Medical Technology, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 203, 221 (1984). 
73. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. The Saikewicz court's holding is illustrative of 
some of the problems in terminology in that a distinction should be made between "life-
prolonging treatment," which usually refers to treatment offering some chance of ex-
tending the patient's life in a meaningful way, and "life-sustaining treatment" or artifi-
cial life support, which serves merely to prolong the patient's existence in a hopeless 
comatose state. Note, Law and Medicine-Individual Rights-The Incompetent's Right to 
Refuse Treatment, 51 TENN. L. REV. 145, 151-52 n.59 (1983). 
Id. 
In rejecting the Quinlan court's approach with specific refer-
ence to 'artificial life-support' and in holding judicial interven-
tion necessary with specific reference to 'potentially life-pro-
longing treatment,' the Saikewicz court creates ambiguity 
about whether it recognizes a distinction between life-prolong-
ing treatment and life-sustaining treatment, or whether it re-
quires judicial intervention in all cases concerning withholding 
or withdrawing treatment from incompetents. 
15
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tions requiring judicial intervention in every case involving the 
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
an incompetent.74 The Saikewicz decision was clarified to some 
degree with respect to "No Code" orders, in Dinnerstein, where 
the appellate court held that prior judicial approval is unneces-
sary in giving orders not to resuscitate where the patient is in 
the terminal stages of an unremitting, fatal illness. n Saikewicz 
was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case of 
In re Spring,76 and followed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
the Severns case.77 
74. 99 Wash. 2d at 125,660 P.2d at 745. 
75. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 138-39. The Dinnerstein court distin-
guished the Saikewicz situation by the following: 
Attempts to apply resuscitation, if successful, will do nothing 
to cure or relieve the illnesses which will have brought the pa-
tient to the threshold of death. The case does not, therefore, 
present the type of significant treatment choice or election 
which, in light of sound medical advice, is to be made by the 
patient, if competent to do so. The latter is the type of lay 
decision which the court in the Saikewicz case had in mind 
when it required judicial approval of a negative decision ... 
by the physician in attendance and by the family or guardian 
of a patient unable to make the choice for himself. This case 
does not offer a life-saving or life-prolonging treatment alter-
native within the meaning of the Saikewicz case. It presents a 
question peculiarly within the competence of the medical pro-
fession of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent 
passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the 
patient's history and condition and the wishes of her family. 
That question is not one for judicial decision, but one for the 
attending physician. 
[d. at 474-75, 380 N.E.2d at 139. 
76. 380 Mass. at 631, 405 N.E.2d at 117. In a somewhat confusing opinion, the su-
preme court stated that while prior judicial approval might not exist, once a court is 
properly presented with a legal question regarding the withholding of treatment, it must 
decide that question and not delegate to some private person or group. [d. at 636-39, 405 
N.E.2d at 120-22. The Spring case involved a son seeking to terminate dialysis treatment 
for his 79 year old father who suffered from chronic organic brain syndrome and end-
stage kidney disease which required hemodialysis treatment three days a week, five 
hours a day. The patient resisted the treatment which caused unpleasant side effects, 
while he would not suffer any side effects if the treatment were terminated. There was 
no evidence that the patient when competent had expressed any wish to withdraw treat-
ment in such circumstances. [d. at 632-33, 405 N.E.2d at 118. The supreme court re-
versed a lower court decision which delegated decision making to the family and physi-
cians. [d. at 630, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
77. 421 A.2d at 1345. The supreme court found that in the absence of statutory 
relief, the Court of Chancery (court of equity) was the appropriate authority to grant 
relief. [d. at 1344. 
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3. The Storar Approach 
A third and more conservative approach was taken by the 
New York Court of Appeals in consolidating two appeals from 
lower court decisions, In re Storar78 and Eichner v. Dillon.79 In 
the first case, In re Storar, the court of appeals reversed a lower 
court's decision to discontinue blood transfusions for a 52 year 
old severely retarded man suffering from terminal cancer.80 In 
the second case, Eichner v. Dillon, also referred to as the 
Brother Fox case, the court of appeals found that a respirator 
could be legally removed from an 83 year old patient in a vegeta-
tive state where the patient had previously expressed a desire 
not to have his life prolonged by artificial means.81 The ruling of 
the Storar court for a Brother Fox-type situation can be summa-
rized as follows: life-sustaining respirators can be withdrawn 
from an incompetent patient if there is clear and convincing 
proof that the patient, when competent, indicated that would 
have been his choice, if he were in a situation without hope of 
78. 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46, reu'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 266. Both Storar and Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd 
sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), involved 
guardians of incompetent persons objecting to the continued use of medical treatment or 
measures to prolong lives of patients diagnosed As fatally ill with no chance of recovery. 
In each case the patients died, rendering the controversy moot, yet the appellate court 
heard the cases to resolve the issues raised. 52 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 420 N.E.2d at 66-67, 
438 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69. 
79. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
80. 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76. The patient lived in 
a state facility where he was visited almost daily by his mother. When doctors recom-
mended that he receive radiation therapy for cancer of the bladder, his mother applied 
to be appointed legal guardian to give consent. Although the disease was in remission for 
a while, it reoccurred. With transfusions, his life span was estimated to be between three 
to six months, while without transfusions death would occur within weeks. He found the 
transfusions disagreeable and his mother requested they be discontinued. I d. at 373-74, 
420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71. The court found that the patient's fatal 
illness had not affected his limited mental ability and that he remained alert and carried 
on usual activities. While the transfusions caused him some pain and could not cure the 
disease, the pain was not excessive. With the transfusions, the patient could maintain his 
usual activities; however, without them, he would bleed to death. Id. at 381-82, 420 
N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. 
81. Id. at 371-72, 379, 420 N.E.2d at 67-68, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70, 274. The 
patient, Brother Fox, a member of a Catholic religious order, sustained a cardiac arrest 
during surgery to repair a hernia. He was placed on a respirator. After he was diagnosed 
as being in a permanent vegetative state, his superior, Father Eichner, requested to be 
appointed guardian with authority to direct removal of the respirator. Id. at 370-71, 420 
N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. 
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recovery.82 The court of appeals found that seeking prior judicial 
approval might be appropriate but that any such procedure is 
optional. 83 
4. The Colyer Approach 
The Washington Supreme Court modified the Quinlan posi-
tion regarding the use of ethics committees by requiring the 
unanimous concurrence of a prognosis board of physicians to 
agree that there was no reasonable medical probability that the 
patient would return to a sapient state in the case of In re Col-
yer. 84 The court also required the judicial appointment of a 
guardian prior to decision making by the family and physi-
cians.8& The Colyer case concerned a husband seeking a court 
order to withdraw a respirator from his 69 year old wife who was 
in a chronic vegetative state as the result of a cardiopulmonary 
arrest.86 Establishing guidelines for future cases, the Colyer 
court found that the courts need no longer be involved once the 
appointment of a guardian to assert the rights of the incompe-
tent was completed through the judicial process and the physi-
cians on a prognosis committee agreed on the diagnosis.87 The 
court, however, becomes the final safeguard in this procedure, 
either in cases where there is disagreement among physicians on 
the prognosis committee, or when any participant in the decision 
or member of the family petitions for court intervention.88 
82. [d. at 379,420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. 
83. [d. at 382-83, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276. 
84. 99 Wash. 2d at 134, 660 P.2d at 749-50. The prognosis board, composed of the 
patient's physician and at least two other disinterested and qualified physicians who 
have an understanding of the patient's condition, would be responsible for confirming 
the attending physician's diagnosis and would protect against an erroneous diagnosis as 
well as questionable motives. The court criticized the Quinlan type of ethics committee 
as being too bureaucratic and cumbersome since it would be composed of non-medical 
personnel. [d. at 134, 660 P.2d at 749. A slightly different approach, that does not re-
quire the judicial appointment of a guardian, was taken by the Florida Supreme Court in 
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). In 
Bludworth, the Florida Supreme Court found that close family members may refuse ex-
traordinary life-sustaining measures when a patient is certified by a physician to be in a 
"permanent vegetative state" if the certification is concurred in by two other physicians. 
[d. at 926. 
85. [d. at 128-29, 660 P.2d at 746. 
86. [d. at 117, 660 P.2d at 740. 
87. [d. at 129, 660 P.2d at 746. 
88. [d. at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750. 
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5. The California Approach 
California's response to the question of when to terminate 
treatment for patients in a persistent vegetative state is found in 
the Natural Death Act89 enacted in 1976, which recognizes a per-
son's right to control medical treatment decisions in the instance 
of a terminal condition.90 Under the Natural Death Act, a com-
petent adult may issue a directive, similar to a will,91 to his phy-
sician which will take effect only if the following requirements 
are met: (1) the patient is suffering from an incurable injury or 
illness; (2) the illness is certified by two physicians as terminal; 
(3) the use of life-sustaining procedures would only artificially 
prolong the moment of death for the patient; and (4) the attend-
ing physician determines death is imminent regardless of 
whether such life-sustaining procedures are applied.92 After 
these requirements are met, the physician, if he believes the pro-
posed procedure will not change the prognosis of imminent 
death, will be absolved of any further liability for carrying out 
the patient's wishes in withholding life-sustaining treatment.93 
Life-sustaining procedure is defined as: (1) any medical tech-
nique which uses mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, 
restore or supplant a vital function; and (2) serves only to artifi-
cially prolong the moment of death.94 Failure by a physician to 
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984). 
90. [d. § 7186. The section in relevant part states that "[AJdult persons have the 
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical 
care, including the decisions to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in 
instances of a terminal condition." [d. 
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186, 7188 (West Supp. 1984). A living will is 
another term to describe this type of procedure in that "it controls events at a later time 
when the patient is still alive, but incompetent, in contrast to wills devising property 
which control events upon a person's death." J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 97. For a 
discussion of some of the problems inherent in living wills, see Eisendrath & Jonsen, The 
Living Will - Help or Hindrance? J. A.M.A. 2054-58 (1983). 
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186, 7188 (West Supp. 1984). Legislation also 
exists to allow the pronouncement of death when there has been a total and irreversible 
cessation of brain function. [d. § 7180. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1984). Also, those who act 
under the direction of a physician will not be guilty of any criminal act or unprofessional 
conduct. [d. The wishes of the patient's family have no effect on a valid and binding 
directive. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 58. Withholding life-sus-
taining procedures in compliance with a directive is not mercy-killing or euthanasia; 
rather, it is "a method recognized under California law, by which a physician can respect 
a patient's instruction to permit an imminent death to proceed naturally." [d. at 72. 
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1984). Life-sustaining proce-
dures do not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical 
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effectuate a binding directive will constitute unprofessional con-
duct, if the physician refuses to make the necessary arrange-
ments, or fails to take the necessary steps to effect the transfer 
of the patient to another physician who will implement the pa-
tient's directive.911 
The difficulty with this legislation lies in its limitations.96 
For example, the Act requires that a directive be made in accord 
with prescribed terms, so that if a patient prepares a different 
directive, it is ineffective.97 Furthermore, for the directive to be 
binding, the patient must have been informed of the diagnosis of 
a terminal condition at least 14 days prior to the time he signs 
the directive, so that it does not apply to those who are not diag-
nosed as terminal at the time of execution, where death may be 
weeks, months, or even years away.9S Consequently, the directive 
procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain. [d. Death must be considered to be immi-
nent, in the opinion of the attending physician, regardless of whether or not life-sus-
taining procedures are utilized. [d. 
95. [d. § 7191(b). 
96. Note, A Proposed Amendment to the California Natural Death Act to Assure 
the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 
579, 605 (1982-1983). Some proposed changes to expand the scope of the Natural Death 
Act include allowing (1) any competent adult to execute the directive rather than only 
those diagnosed as terminal, (2) any directive to be used with wording that is in substan-
tial compliance with the prescribed form, (3) the directive to be effective until revoked, 
and (4) the family of an incompetent patient to assert the patient's rights. [d. at 606-08. 
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7187(b), 7188, 7191(c) (West Supp. 1984). Sec-
tion 7187(b) requires that the written document be executed in accordance with the re-
quirements of § 7188. [d. § 7187(b). However, if the directive is no longer binding, the 
attending physician may give weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's direc-
tions regarding the withholding of life-sustaining treatment. [d. § 7191(c). In the event of 
a non-binding directive, guidelines from the California Hospital Association suggest that 
the physician may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures when, in his judg-
ment, death is imminent. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 60. The 
physician should also consult the patient's family and consider factors such as informa-
tion provided by the family, as well as the nature of the patient's illness, disease, or 
injury in determining whether the totality of the circumstances justifies effectuating the 
directive. [d. The physician should also consult the hospital administrator prior to termi-
nating treatment in cases where the directive was signed before the patient was diag-
nosed as having a terminal illness. [d. 
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1984). "If the declarant 
[were) a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or reexecuting the directive, 
the directive shall be conclusively presumed ... to be the directions of the patient 
.... " [d. A "[q)ualified patient means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be 
afflicted with a terminal condition." [d. § 7187(e). A terminal condition is defined to be 
an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of the appIr-
cation of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce 
death. [d. § 7187(0. 
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would not be binding on the physician if it were signed by a 
patient in good health. Furthermore, a valid directive, unless re-
voked, is effective for only five years from the date of its 
execution.99 
Some of these shortcomings were addressed in 1983 with the 
passage of California Civil Code, Section 2434, which permits an 
individual to designate an attorney-in-fact who has the durable 
power of attorney over health care decisions when the individual 
becomes incompetent. loo The statute which provides for oral and 
written revocation requires that two non-interested witnesses at-
test that the principal appears to be of sound mind.lol This leg-
islation is naturally restricted by the need for the individual to 
have designated an attorney-in-fact prior to becoming incompe-
tent and the fact that the designation lasts for a period of only 
seven years, unless at the end of the seven years the principal 
lacks capacity to make health care decisions for himself.l02 When 
a patient who has designated an attorney-in-fact for health care 
decisions becomes incompetent, the designated attorney-in-fact 
should be consulted. l03 An order to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment cannot be issued without the concurrence 
of the attorney-in-fact unless specific court authorization has 
been secured. l04 Assuming that the durable power of attorney 
for health care is executed properly, it provides a good method 
for effectuating the wishes of patients in a persistent vegetative 
99. [d. § 7189.5. There is no criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for 
failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to statute unless that person had actual 
knowledge of the revocation. [d. § 7189(3)(b). 
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1984). An attorney-in-fact may not make 
health care decisions unless the principal is unable to give informed consent. [d. The 
attorney-in-fact also has priority over any other person to act for the principal in all 
matters of health care decisions. [d. Health care refers to any care, treatment, or proce-
dure to maintain, diagnose or treat the patient's physical or mental condition. [d. 
2430(b). Health care decisions refer to consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of con-
sent to health care. [d. § 2430(c). 
101. [d. § 2432. Witnesses may not be health care providers, operators of commu-
nity facilities, or their employees. [d. § 2432B(d)(I)(4)(5). Furthermore, at least one wit-
ness shall not be an heir by devise or intestacy or a relative. [d. § 2432(B)(e)(I)(2). The 
durable power of attorney is not effective, if a principal is a patient in a nursing facility, 
unless one of the witnesses is a patient advocate or ombudsman. [d. § 2432(B)(0. 
102. [d. § 2436.5. 
103. [d. § 2434(a). This power does not allow the attorney-in-fact to consent to com-
mitment in a mental health treatment facility, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, ster-
ilization, or abortion. [d. § 2435(a)-(e). 
104. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66r. 
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state, since the responsibility of the attorney-in-fact is to act in 
a manner consistent with the desires of the patient. 105 
In addition to this legislation, in 1981, a joint Biomedical 
Ethics Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association 
and Los Angeles Medical Association along with the local Dis-
trict Attorney's Office and the County Coroner's Office, issued 
guidelines for withdrawing respirators from terminally ill pa-
tients. loa Under these guidelines, a respirator can be removed in 
three instances: (1) when the patient has suffered a total and 
irreversible cessation of brain function, i.e., brain death; (2) 
under the provisions of the California Natural Death Act; or (3) 
when the patient's medical record contains a written diagnosis of 
an irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state. 107 These 
guidelines, however, do not discuss the removal of food and 
water. 
Consequently, in California, while there are medical guide-
lines for the termination of treatment of patients in a persistent 
vegetative state, the guidelines have no statutory authority re-
garding termination of treatment unless the patient meets the 
standard of brain death, has previously designated an attorney-
in-fact, or has executed a binding directive to authorize termina-
tion. The Barber case is an illustration of some of the problems 
that can arise in California due to the absence of legislation re-
garding the termination of treatment for patients in a persistent 
vegetative state. 
III. THE BARBER DECISION 
A. The Factual Setting and Procedural History 
In Barber, a unanimous three judge appellate court panel 
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1984). If the patient's desires are unknown, 
the attorney-in-fact is to act in the best interests of the patient. [d. 
106. JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS OF THE Los ANGELES MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION AND THE Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, Guidelines for Discontinu-
ance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support Systems under Specified Circumstances, (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE). These guidelines have been endorsed by 
the California Medical Association and the California Hospital Association. CALIFORNIA 
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 62. 
107. JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE, supra note 106. 
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from the Second Appellate District held that Doctors Barber 
and Nedjl were not guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder for removing a respirator, other life-sustaining equip-
ment, intravenous feeding, and nasogastric tubes from a 55 year 
old comatose patient over a three to five day period. 1 OS The cir-
cumstances precipitating removal occurred after successful com-
pletion of routine surgery for closure of an ileostomy, when the 
patient, Clarence Herbert, suffered a cardiorespiratory arrest in 
the recovery room.109 Reasons for the cardiorespiratory arrest re-
main uncertain.1l0 The patient was resuscitated by a medical 
team and immediately placed on a respirator. ll1 
Within the three days following the arrest, Doctors Barber 
and Nedjl determined that Mr. Herbert had suffered severe 
brain damage that left him in a persistent vegetative state.ll2 
This determination was made as a result of tests and examina-
tions made by several physicians, including Doctors Barber (Mr. 
Herbert's internist) and Nedjl, (Mr. Herbert's surgeon).1l3 At 
that time, the defendants informed Mr. Herbert's family of their 
opinion of his condition and chances for recovery.1I4 Following 
this meeting, the family convened and drafted a written request 
to the hospital indicating they wanted all life-sustaining ma-
chines removed. lUi Consequently, three days after the cardiore-
spiratory arrest, the respirator was disconnected. Mr. Herbert 
continued to breathe after removal of the respirator, but showed 
no signs of improvement, such as recovery of consciousness.1I8 
108. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484. 
109. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
110. L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1983, Part II at 1. The prosecution dismissed the defense 
suggestion that the coma could be attributed to cardiac problems since the defendants 
did not consider Mr. Herbert's heart history serious. If, however, this were accurate, the 
prosecution contended Mr. Herbert's doctors were deemed negligent in allowing him to 
undergo elective surgery and failing to allow extra precautions in monitoring. The prose-
cution also alleged that due to understaffing and insufficient monitoring, Mr. Herbert's 
difficulties went unnoticed until he was found cyanotic in the recovery room. Steinbock, 
The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 13-14 (1983). 
111. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
112. Id. 
113. [d. 
114. Id. There was some dispute as to the precise terminology used by the doctors. 
Mrs. Herbert testified she had been 'told that her husband's brain was dead, yet the 
brain, by definition, was not dead since there was still lower brain function. L.A. Times, 
supra note 50, at I, 6. 
115. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
116. Id. 
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Two days later, the defendants, after consulting with the family, 
ordered the removal of the intravenous tubes which provided 
nourishment and hydration. ll7 Six days later Mr. Herbert 
died. 118 
The murder and conspiracy to murder charges were initially 
dismissed by the magistrate who concluded that (1) the defen-
dants did not "kill" Mr. Herbert since their conduct was not the 
proximate cause of death (the principal cause listed on the death 
certificate was diffuse encephalomalacia); (2) the defendants' 
conduct under the circumstances was the result of good faith, 
ethical and sound medical judgment and not unlawful; and (3) 
the defendants' state of mind did not amount to malice. ll9 The 
superior court judge reinstated the complaint since he concluded 
that "as a matter of law the petitioners' conduct, however well 
motivated, and however ethical or sound in the eyes of the medi-
cal profession, was, under California law, 'unlawful.' "l20 The de-
fendants then petitioned the court of appeal for a review of the 
trial court ruling.121 The court of appeal issued a peremptory 
writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from taking further 
action in the matter other than to vacate its order reinstating 
117. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Testimony at the preliminary hearing by an 
attending nurse indicated that two days after the respirator was removed, two family 
members at Mr. Herbert's bedside were adamant that the intravenous tubes should be 
removed. The nurse refused to remove the tubes because she had no order from a doctor. 
Shortly thereafter she received the order. L.A. Times, supra note 50, at 1. After the 
removal of the intravenous tubes, Mr. Herbert received nursing care which preserved his 
dignity and provided a clean and hygienic environment. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 
Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
118. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 13. Mr. Herbert died from dehydration and pneu-
monia.ld. 
119. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The charges were brought 
following information given by a nursing supervisor who went to the authorities because 
she disagreed with the defendants' actions. At the preliminary lw.aring the prosecution 
alleged that even if the removal of the respirator were legal in other contexts, it was part 
of a conspiracy to kill Mr. Herbert to hide malpractice. The prosecution claimed that 
malpractice occurred since basic medical standards of care were not followed in the re-
covery room and if the standards had been followed, the injury to Mr. Herbert's brain 
could have been prevented. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 13-14. 
120. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The decision to reinstate 
charges was apparently based neither on the prosecution's "cover up" theory, nor on 
acceptance of any important legal difference between disconnecting a respirator and re-
moval of intravenous feeding tubes, but rather that California law does not allow anyone 
to shorten another's life, and that the magistrate failed to find Mr. Herbert's condition 
irreversible. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 15. 
121. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
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the complaint and to enter a new order denying the prosecu-
tion's motion for reinstatement of the charges.122 The reversal 
writ issued by the appellate court was based on the grounds that 
existing state legislation did not require guardianship proceed-
ings or judicial approval prior to the termination of treatment.123 
Moreover, the court found that the failure to continue treat-
ment, though intentional and with the knowledge that the pa-
tient would die, was not an unlawful breach of legal duty. 124 
B. The Court's Reas~ning 
The Barber court, expressing a reluctance to evaluate the 
petitioners' conduct in the context of the inadequate framework 
of the criminal law, began its review by stating that the issues in 
this case required determination against a background of legal 
and moral considerations which had not as yet been adequately 
addressed by the legislature. 1211 Having established that existing 
legislation did not address withdrawal of life-support systems 
for patients in a persistent vegetative state, the court found that 
the termination of life-support measures is not an affirmative 
act, but rather an omission or withdrawal of further treat-
ment. 128 The court reasoned that the withdrawal of mechanical 
support devices is comparable to withholding manual adminis-
tration of medicines. 127 
The court then turned its inquiry to the issue of whether 
the withdrawal of treatment, i.e., the failure to act, was a breach 
of a legal duty, and found that there was no duty to continue 
treatment once it has proved to be ineffective.128 The court 
stated that "[a]lthough there may be a duty to provide life-sus-
taining machinery in the immediate aftermath of a cardio-re-
122. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 494. 
123. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93. 
124. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
125. Id. at lOll, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court also determined that the California 
Natural Death Act did not represent the exclusive basis for terminating life-support 
equipment in CcJifornia. [d. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
126. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1017-18,195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91. The main issue becomes one of "deter-
mining the duties owed by a physician to a patient who has been reliably diagnosed as in 
a comatose state from which any meaningful recovery of cognitive brain function is ex-
ceedingly unlikely." Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
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spiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it has 
become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel."129 
The court also determined that there was no rational dis-
tinction between the use of respirators and the provision of nu-
trition and hydration in situations such as Barber. ISO The court 
found that respirators, nutrition and hydration are forms of life-
support and should be regarded in the same manner as any 
other medical procedure, rather than as typical human ways of 
providing nutrition and hydration. lSI Hence, the court concluded 
that medical nutrition and hydration may not always provide 
net benefits to patients. ls2 
Disagreeing with the Quinlan and Saikewicz approaches of 
distinguishing which life-sustaining procedure should be used 
and for how long its use must be maintained in terms of ordi-
nary and extraordinary means of treatment, ISS the Barber court 
found a benefits and burdens test more logical. IS. Under this test 
the decision to continue treatment is made by considering 
whether the treatment will provide benefits which outweigh the 
burdens to the patient.m Therefore, the burden of even a mini-
mally intrusive treatment maybe disproportionate to its benefits 
when the patient's prognosis is hopeless. lSG The court concluded 
this situation was applicable to the Barber case, based on evi-
dence presented at the preliminary hearing, which supported the 
conclusions that "Mr. Herbert had virtually no chance of recov-
ering his cognitive or motor functions. "lS7 
129. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
130. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court found that the intravenous admin-
istration of nourishment and fluids is the same as the use of the respirator in that one is 
a mechanical feeding device and the other is a mechanical breathing device. Id. at 1016-
17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 192 n.52). 
131. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. This evaluation would con-
sider the benefits and burdens of providing nutrition. Id. 
132. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Although this position is consistent with the 
findings of the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 3, at 190, it remains controversial. See CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, supra note 16, at 63. 
133. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47-48,355 A.2d at 667-68; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 
738, 370 N.E.2d at 423-24. 
134. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92. 
135. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The court stated that: 
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Acknowledging that there was no applicable legislation re-
quiring the appointment of a legal guardian, the Barber court 
found that Mrs. Herbert (the decedent's wife) and children were 
the proper persons to determine the best interests of the pa-
tient. 138 The court stated that any surrogate ought to be guided 
by knowledge of the patient's own desires, or if this were not 
possible, by what would be in the patient's best interests. ls9 Fi-
nally, based on the absence of applicable legislation requiring le-
gal proceedings, the court concurred with the Quinlan decision 
by determining that prior judicial approval of the decision to 
terminate treatment was unnecessary and possibly unwise.140 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Problem 
While appropriately acknowledging the drawbacks of de-
signing an ethical and moral code for doctors through the prose-
cution of a lawsuit,14l the Barber court inadequately addressed 
[d. 
[t)he most optimistic prognosis provided by any of the testify-
ing experts was that the patient had an excellent chance of 
'recovery.' However, recovery was defined in terms of a spec-
trum running from a persistent vegetative state to full recov-
ery. A persistent vegetative state was described as that state in 
which the patient would have no contact with the environ-
ment but parts of the brain would continue to live. The doctor 
who was of course approaching the case after the fact and 
from a hindsight view, was unable to predict where on this 
continuum Mr. Herbert was likely to end up. Several studies 
on which the expert relied, however, indicated that the 
chances for unimpaired or full recovery were miniscule. The 
results of these studies coincided with the diagnoses of the 
physicians who had actually examined and dealt with the pa-
tient before his demise. 
138. [d. at 1021 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 n.2. The court acknowledged that 
"[d)espite the fact that Mr. Herbert apparently entered the name of his sister-in-law on 
a hospital form (the purpose of which was unclear from the evidence), his wife and chil-
dren were the most obviously appropriate surrogates in this case." [d. The court also 
referred to evidence that Mr. Herbert had previously expressed to his wife that he would 
not want to be kept alive by machines. [d. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
141. [d. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court stated that "a murder prosecution 
is a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced with deci-
sions concerning the use of costly and extraordinary 'life support' equipment." [d. 
27
Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
398 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:371 
some of the crucial issues involved. The most serious problem 
with the decisions made by the doctors and family members in 
this case was the unusually short length of time within which 
they made their decision to discontinue life-support systems.142 
Within three days from the date of the cardiorespiratory arrest, 
Mr. Herbert was disconnected from his respirator,143 and two 
days later he was disconnected from intravenous feeding based 
on a determination by his physicians that he was in a persistent 
vegetative state. I44 Significant medical authority and case law 
exist to indicate that the irreversibility of a coma cannot be de-
termined within so short a time. HI! Moreover, in the Barber case, 
there was no clearly documented diagnosis of irreversible coma 
which would meet the Los Angeles County Guidelines for Dis-
continuance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support Systems Under 
Specified Circumstances to allow for disconnecting a respira-
142. See infra note 145. 
143. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
144. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
145. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 168-69 & n.52; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING 
DEATH, supra note 2, at 92-95, 98-99 (1981); A Definition of Irreversible Coma, Report of 
the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of 
Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337 (1968). See also In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 144-45, 660 
P.2d at 754-55, (Dore, J. dissenting). Justice Dore objected to 25 days as being an unac-
ceptable time period for determining whether the patient in Colyer would have recov-
ered brain functions. Id. at 145, 660 P.2d at 755. He claimed that other similar cases 
provide little legal support for withdrawing life-support mechanisms in such a short 
time. Id. at 144, 660 P.2d at 754 (citing Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728,380 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 
38 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.W. 2d 64; Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 
1, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 49, 426 N.E.2d 809). He concludes: 
Leach allowed termination of life supporting mechanisms 
in 4 months; Severns in 5 months; the Quinlan case, after 1 
year. The other two cases, Saikewicz and Storar, involved 
noncomatose individuals, both of whom were retarded. The 
majority opinion [in Colyer] represents the most liberal inter-
pretation in the United States as to the length of time an in-
competent must remain on a life supporting mechanism before 
it can be medically determined there is no reasonable possibil-
ity of the incompetent ever emerging from the present coma-
tose condition to a cognitive sapient state. 
Evidence presented to the trial court by the attending 
physicians has shown that Bertha Colyer was indeed alive, and 
a finding was made by the trial court to that effect. There do 
exist documented medical instances when fact patterns similar 
to the one at bar were present and the patient ultimately sur-
vived, although these cases are rare. 
Id. at 144, 660 P.2d at 754. 
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tor. us Thus, the Barber court has sanctioned not only controver-
sial but precipitous medical actions, without substantial legal or 
medical support. 147 
In addition, there is no clear legal or medical consensus as 
to whether nourishment and hydration should be discontinued 
when the patient is in a persistent vegetative state.148 Certainly, 
as the Barber court found, the distinction made between with-
holding air and withholding food and water, may be based more 
on emotional symbolism than on rational differences.H9 How-
ever, if nourishment is considered basic comfort care to ease the 
dying process, it may be required and, therefore, distinguished 
from the use of a respirator.1IIO Also, a difference exists as to the 
level of pain and suffering involved when distinguishing between 
the withdrawal of a respirator and the withdrawal of nourish-
ment and hydration. un When the respirator is withheld, little 
suffering or pain is involved.U2 However, death from starvation 
and/or dehydration may take from several days to several weeks 
and may cause pain and suffering depending on the level of pa-
tient awareness and the medications provided.1I13 Assuming that 
in certain limited situations, where the patient is in a persistent 
vegetative state, withholding nutrition and hydration should be 
the accepted practice, the question that still remains is whether 
the physicians in Barber acted too quickly in removing the 
respirator. 
146. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 54 (Cum. Supp. 1983). There was no written diag· 
nosis of irreversible coma as required under the guidelines. Moreover, since Mr. Her-
bert's wife had filed a civil malpractice suit (cite omitted) and there was conflicting evi-
dence as to what information was given to the family, the necessity for documentation 
avoids argument and uncertainty after the fact. [d. 
147. See supra note 145. 
148. See supra note 55. Also the California Hospital Association recognized this is-
sue as controversial by contrasting the findings of the President's Commission with the 
Department of Health and Human Services' handicapped infant regulations. CALIFORNIA 
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 63. 
149. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. 
150. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 62-63 (Cum. Supp. 1983). Comfort care is not af-
fected by a hopeless or terminal diagnosis and is required to accord the patient as digni-
fied a death as reasonably possible. [d. at 62 (Cum. Supp. 1983). 
151. [d. at 63 (Cum. Supp. 1983). When death results from the withdrawal of the 
respirator, the patient becomes unconscious several minutes after withdrawal and suffers 
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B. Resolution 
1. Statutory Resolution 
Resolution of some of the termination of life-support issues 
for patients in a persistent vegetative state, could be accom-
plished by statute. For example, the Los Angeles County Guide-
lines for Discontinuance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support 
Systems Under Specified Circumstances could be adopted or a 
minimum time frame could be established before a respirator is 
disconnected. However, revisions in statutory law often can not 
keep pace with the ongoing medical and technological advances 
that consistently present new legal and ethical issues. Moreover, 
statutes while helpful, are an unsatisfactory way to resolve issues 
where medical uncertainty still exists and further ethical discus-
sion is necessary. For example, in cases concerning the with-
drawal of nutrition or the determination of the patient's best in-
terests, it would be difficult for a statute to address all of the 
individual variations present in a particular case. However, a 
statute could require health care facilities to establish ethics 
committees for resolution of those issues which cannot be ad-
dressed directly by statute. 
2. Ethics Committees 
Because of the lack of medical and legal consensus, the most 
promising approach to resolving decisions regarding the with-
drawal of life-support systems appears to be the Quinlan con-
cept of an ethics committee. A committee allows the responsibil-
ity of judgment to be shared in cases where no guidelines have 
been established and the proposition is controversial, such as the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. The ethics committee 
approach allows for a case-by-case evaluation to take into ac-
count the differences that impact and affect each decision. 
Although ethics committees are recommended by the Cali-
fornia Hospital Association to assist with decisionmaking,1114 
154. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66(d)-66(e). Ethics com-
mittees would serve to perform such functions as assisting in the formulation of hospital 
.policies pertaining to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, serving as a 
resource to those involved in biomedical and ethical decisions, and providing a forum for 
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they are not found in most hospitals. Less than 20 % of the acute 
care hospitals in the United States had ethics committees in 
1982.11111 One of the largest problems facing the formation of eth-
ics committees is physician resistance. IlI6 There is a fear among 
some physicians that the physician-patient relationship will be 
destroyed or a committee will dictate rules on what is a private 
matter. However, an ethics committee can be structured to pro-
vide guidance, not to be the ultimate arbiter. The purpose of a 
committee is to spell out those values that constitute the context 
in which individual prudence must operate.m Although this ap-
proach, depending on the structure and specific function of the 
committee, may remove some autonomy from the treating physi-
cians and family, its advantages can be likened to the value of 
multi-judge courts in resolving difficult questions of law on 
appeal. IllS 
Another major objection to ethics committees is the lack of 
clinical knowledge of committee members.IlI9 There is a concern 
that members with a non-clinical background will not be able to 
understand sufficiently the medical details upon which medical 
judgment is based. Although there is substance to this objection, 
it should function as a challenge rather than as an obstacle.I60 
Medical personnel must have the ability to translate, while non-
clinical members must familiarize themselves with medical ter-
minology.I61 This is meant to insure the patient's best interest to 
be viewed as a broad human judgment, rather than simply a sci-
discussion about biomedical ethical issues. [d. 
155. Jonsen, A.R., What is Extraordinary Life Support? Medical Staff Conference, 
University of California, San Francisco, 141 WEST J. MED. 358, 362 (Sept. 1984). The 
University of San Francisco h!lS had an ethics committee for seven years. [d. The com-
mittee is composed of seven doctors, two nurses, a chaplin, an attorney, and a professor 
of ethics in medicine, and unanimous decisions are reached on all cases. Even when it 
has no referrals, the ethics committee meets monthly to address policy questions. Infor-
mation as to the University of San Francisco's ethics committee was provided by a tele-
phone interview with Albert R. Jonsen, Professor of Ethics in Medicine and Chief, Divi-
sion of Biomedical Ethics, Department of Medicine, University of California, San 
Francisco on November 26, 1984. 
156. McCormick, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH 
CARE, 150, 153 (Sept. 1984). 
157. [d. at 153. 
158. 90 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. 
159. McCormick, supra note 156, at 154. 
160. [d. at 153. 
161. [d. 
31
Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
402 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:371 
entific judgment. I62 
While an ethics committee can complicate the decision 
making process by merely multiplying the number of opinions as 
to appropriate treatment, the availability of a vehicle for consul-
tation is desirable. I6s The committee need not be involved for 
the majority of cases. However, whenever disagreement or un-
certainty exist, the involvement of such an ethics committee is 
of value. I64 The hospital itself could specify the types of cases 
which would come under the ethics committee review. 
Besides using an ethics committee for cases where there is 
medical uncertainty, an ethics committee is best suited to take 
into account a variety of economic considerations. For example, 
government has limited resources. I611 Competing demands are 
made on these resources and medical need is only one of those 
forces seeking the maximum allocation from the available 
sources. I66 Economic factors cannot be ignored when resources 
are scarce and an alternate allocation of the resources and per-
sonnel might benefit other patients more. On the other hand, 
since Medicare and Medicaid payments are set, regardless of 
length of time or treatment provided, there may be a need for 
ethics committees to constrain inappropriate financial considera-
tions regarding treatment decisions that have little relationship 
to the patient's best interests. I67 
162. [d. at 154. 
163. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 444-45. 
164. [d. at 445. 
165. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 174. 
166. [d. 
167. The prosecution at the preliminary hearing in the Barber case had tried to 
show that the defendants and the hospital benefitted financially from Mr. Herbert's de-
mise. However, the municipal court judge ruled that evidence on the financial state of 
the hospital and its arrangements with its doctors is irrelevant in determining whether 
sufficient evidence of murder existed for a trial. L.A. Times, supra note 50, at I, 6. See 
also McCormick, supra note 156, at 152, for a discussion of the emergence of economic 
considerations in operating health care facilities for profit and in the use of salaried em-
ployee physicians. 
Not only can economic factors influence a physician's opinion regarding the discon-
tinuation of life-support systems, but these factors can also affect the family. The over-
whelming cost of medical care can influence the decisions of the family regarding the 
prolongation of intensive treatments for those family members who are in a persistent 
vegetative state. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 185 n.35. 
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Thus, the concept of shared judgment in decision making 
allows for consideration of all of these factors (medical, ethical, 
economic, and legal), with more detached investigation, than if 
left solely to the treating physicians and the family. For exam-
ple, while responsibility is diffused for an obviously difficult de-
cision where the ethical and medical dimensions are complex, 
this diffusion can allow a more truly informed and less self-pro-
tective prognosis and treatment or non-treatment recommenda-
tion to be made. I68 Moreover, in the absence of statutory law in 
this area, this approach places the treating physicians in a better 
position if subsequent litigation occurs. I6S 
The ethics committee, composed of lay persons and medical 
personnel, provides a broader prospective than a prognosis 
board. However, the prognosis board is an alternative that does 
increase participation in decision making. Because of the seri-
ousness of a decision to withdraw life-support systems, the value 
of a multidisciplinary approach of an ethics committee which 
takes into account legal and ethical perspectives, in addition to 
the medical perspectives which are considered by a prognosis 
board, seems to have more advantages than a prognosis board. 
Either an ethics committee or a prognosis board would have 
provided support for the physicians in the Barber case, since 
withdrawal of all life-support systems, including intravenous 
feeding devises, after five days is not a universally accepted 
medical practice.no The only necessity for judicial intervention 
would be in cases where there is a disagreement by the ethics 
committee or prognosis board as to treatment procedures. The 
Colyer court adequately outlined the situations requiring judi-
cial intervention in the decision to withdraw life-support sys-
tems. I71 Even the Quinlan court, which held that as a general 
procedure judicial intervention is unnecessary, found that 
168. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 444. 
169. As long as the concern over civil and criminal liability exists, a recommenda-
tion from an ethics committee can confirm the diagnosis made by the physician, the 
appropriateness of discontinuing further treatment a'3 proposed, and that such action is 
consistent with accepted medical practice. Thus, the physician is insulated from a mal-
practice claim. Also, a decision that is sometimes viewed with fear or suspicion receives 
more social acceptability. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 383 & n.9. 
170. See generally D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 382; CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, supra note 16, at 36. 
171. 99 Wash. 2d at 137,660 P.2d at 751. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
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"[t]his is not to say that in the case of an otherwise justifiable 
controversy access to the courts would be foreclosed; we speak 
rather of a general practice and procedure."172 Although the 
Barber court cited Quinlan to find judicial intervention unneces-
sary, the Barber court apparently ignored this specific exception 
which was found in Quinlan. 17s Consequently, not only the in-
terests of the patient, but also the interests of the treating phy-
sician in avoiding civil and criminal liability, require the use of 
an ethics committee, or in the alternative, court approval, to 
provide additional input regarding judgment in the frontier ar-
eas of medical decisionmaking, such as withdrawal of nutrition 
and hydration, or a determination as to the irreversibility of a 
coma. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Barber court has taken a major step in establishing 
California legal standards for the withdrawal of life-support 
treatment from patients in a persistent vegetative state. This de-
cision arose due to a lack of adequate legislative or medical 
guidelines in this area. To apply the Barber holding may be to 
encourage precipitous withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, as 
well as respirators, for patients who in fact have a chance of re-
covery or whose chances of recovery have been inadequately as-
sessed. In addition, even with the Barber decision, the physician 
may still risk civil or criminal liability.174 
The better alternative is for the legal and medical profes-
sions to encourage the legislature to bypass Barber and revise 
existing statutes or establish procedural guidelines responsive to 
the needs of the patient in a persistent vegetative state. The 
statute or guidelines must address the issues of: (1) decision 
making for those patients who have not previously expressed 
their wishes concerning the extent of care, (2) withdrawal of nu-
trition and hydration, and (3) when court intervention is appro-
priate. Moreover, a statute or guidelines must require the use of 
ethics committees to insure maximum protection of each indi-
172. 90 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. 
173. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493, where the court 
apparently did not see that any justiciable controversy was involved in this particular 
situation. 
174. See supra note 16. 
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vidual's rights and be responsive to technological changes. Fi-
nally, it is necessary that the statute or guidelines make an ade-
quate statement exonerating the physician from criminal 
liability. 
Sheila Brutoco* 
* Golden Gate School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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